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This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the control schemes
in the Indian tea industry during the Great Depression, whe-
reby producers attempted to collude by reducing output. Analy-
sis of data from a panel of plantations shows that collusion
was effective. We suggest that the system of management of
plantations by "managing agents" enhanced the degree of mono-
poly in the industry, thereby facilitating collusion. The
social cohesiveness of expatriate business may have also
contributed to the enforcement of collusion.
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hospitality.1. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of overproduction widely affected
agricultural commodities in the interwar period. Price support
schemes through restriction of output or export were tried out
in many commodities. Since most primary commodities have low
price elasticities of demand, output restriction increases the
revenues and profits of the producers, and is undoubtedly in
their collective interest. Nevertheless, each individual
producer has a strong incentive to expand output in response
to higher prices, and thus such schemes for restricting output
become difficult to enforce. Enforcement of collusion can be
a problem at two levels: first, producers from another country
can enter the market and second, producers within a country
can deviate from the agreement. Enforcement problems are
particularly severe in markets with a large number of produ-
cers, which are close to the competitive paradigm. This is the
case in most agricultural markets, and in these markets,
higher prices create incentives for producers to expand out-
put.
This paper examines the schemes which aimed to restrict
output in the Indian tea industry during the Depression. Our
focus in on the so-called control schemes of the years 1930
and 1933. These schemes are of particular interest since there
was an explicit, voluntary agreement by the producers to
restrict output. Both the explicitness and the voluntary
nature of this agreement is noteworthy. Since the agreement to
reduce output was voluntary and not legally enforceable, the
agreement must have been enforced non-cooperatively. Further,
1the explicitness of the agreement and of the debates regarding
its continuance is a major advantage for two reasons. First,
it allows us to separate the years in which producers at-
tempted collusion from the years that they did not. Second,
the reasons for the continuance/suspension of collusion can
also be discerned from this debate. This explicitness is a
major advantage of a historical studies of collusion (see also
the work of Porter, 1983), since anti-trust legislation no
longer permits explicit collusion in most countries.
In order to analyze the effectiveness of collusion, this
paper analyzes the output decisions of the plantations at the
micro level. We rely upon a panel data set of output, prices
and acreage for a sample of 114 tea plantations in Eastern
India, the main tea producing region in the country. Our main
finding is that plantations reduced output in the years of
operation of the control scheme. The extent of this output
reduction is significant, in terms of size, as well as statis-
tically. The apparent success of the scheme appears paradoxi-
cal given the large number of tea plantations in the industry
and the relatively high short run supply elasticity of tea.
We offer two complementary explanations for our surpri-
sing finding. First, we suggest that the organizational struc-
ture of the industry was one major factor which facilitated
"cooperation" or collusion between plantations in output
reduction. Plantations were managed mainly by a small number
of "managing agents", and this ensured a higher degree of
monopoly in the industry, in terms of the effective control
structure. The 114 firms were mainly managed by thirteen
2managing agents, but five of these managing agents controlled
62 firms. Since each managing agent was responsible for a
number of plantations, we suggest that each managing agent did
not seek to maximize the profits of each plantation taken
separately, but tried to optimize the performance of the set
of plantations under their control, as a whole. We suggest
that the industry effectively functioned as a "repeated oligo-
poly", so that collusion was sustained despite producers
having the incentive to free ride in the short run.
In addition to the above "economic" explanation for the
success of the control scheme, we would also like to suggest
that there were socio-political reasons for differential
behaviour of different producers. The number of managing
agents, while small in relation to the number of plantations,
is still relatively large. The managing agents belonged to a
small and cohesive social group, of British nationals in a
colonial environment. As a cohesive group, they might have
been able to impose social sanctions on any member who viola-
ted the social norm, and this may have helped to sustain
collusive behaviour in the economic domain. In contrast, the
smaller and newer producers of the peripheral regions were
mainly Indian. Being peripheral to the main social group, they
were immune to its sanctions.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2
describes the main features of the market for tea. Section 3
outlines the structure of ownership and control in the Indian
tea industry. Section 4 describes the control schemes. Section
5 sets out a simple model of noncooperative collusion. Section
36 presents our econometric model and estimations. Section 7
discusses possible explanations for our results.
2. DETERMINANTS OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY
Britain was the main consumer of tea. Over 50 percent of
total world exports of tea was absorbed by Britain. It was
the demand and supply in this market that determined interna-
tional tea prices. India, Ceylon and Indonesia controlled over
80 per cent of the world tea exports. India, the country of
our focus, was a major producing country and over 85 percent
of India’s tea exports was to the United Kingdom. Table 1
shows the overwhelming importance of the British market. Table
2 shows the market shares of the main exporting countries for
selected years in the period 1927-1938.
Trends in tea prices are influenced by some special
features of the demand and supply of this consumption good. On
the demand side, tea occupies a small proportion in the consu-
mers’ budget. Up to a certain level of demand for tea is
sensitive to changes in price and income. Thereafter, the
product shows low price and income elasticities of demand.
Superimposed on this there may be a tendency to shift from
common to better quality teas as income increases. However,
consumer preferences for beverages are somewhat fixed and
switching from one beverage to the other may take place over a
long period. Therefore the market for tea in the industriali-
zed countries tends to increase in line with population gro-
wth. In developing countries, where income levels are lower,
demand shows larger price and income elasticities. Estimates
4show price elasticity of demand in the United Kingdom to be -
0.32 for the period 1920-38 and income elasticity to be 0.04
(Stone, 1954). Calculations of income elasticities for India
based on cross section data for a later period, show the
income elasticities in the urban and rural areas to be 1.11
and 1.047 respectively (Ayengar, 1967). However, not much
effort was made to exploit the domestic market until the
1930s.
In the 1930s the UK market remained stagnant as did other
export markets. It was the domestic market in India which
showed a dramatic increase. A market which had expanded by
only 15 million pounds to 50 million lbs in the decade of the
1920s, showed an increase of 13 million pounds for 1933-34 and
consumed over 100 million lbs of tea by the end of the 1930s
(Indian tea statistics). India, in the 1930s, had become the
second most important outlet for black teas although the per
capita consumption was still very low.(Wickizer,1940). This
was prompted in part by an aggresive advertising campaign. The
ECONOMIST reported in 1931 that when the Indian Tea Cess
Committee was spending 50,000 pound sterling annually in
advertising in America with apparently little to show for it,
considerable success could be seen from an advertising cam-
paign of 45,000 pound sterling in India in the early 1930s.
(Economist, October 31, 1931)
On the supply side, supply expansion takes place in the
long run mainly through the expansion in acreage. Since tea
crops mature in 6-7 years, there is a substantial gestation
lag in the adjustment of supply to demand. Nevertheless, there
5is also the scope for varying output in the short run, by
variations in plucking tea leaves. Finer plucking reduce
output, while coarser plucking can increase output. This
ability to vary output in the short run is an important featu-
re of tea production, which distinguishes it from other plan-
tation crops. When prices reach rock bottom, output can be
restricted by resorting to finer plucking. High prices, on the
other hand encourage coarser plucking. This relatively high
short-run price elasticity implies that producers can react
more quickly to situations of overproduction and excesses in
stocks. It is through this instrument that the efforts at
price control have sought to operate. Plucking is done ma-
nually. Fine plucking refers to careful selection of the
finest leaves, while coarse plucking is less discriminating.
Therefore plucking not only affects the quantity of output,
but also its quality. Coarser plucking implies an increase in
the supply of common teas and therefore a lower average qua-
lity. Similarly, finer plucking reduces the supply of common
teas, thereby raising average quality and prices.
3. THE INDIAN TEA INDUSTRY
The Indian tea industry was set up in the second half of
the 19th century. The industry was organized as joint stock
companies owning different plantations. An important feature
of the pattern of control in the industry was the managing
agency system - a few managing agents controlled a large
number of tea plantations.
6The managing agency in India was the archetype of expa-
triate British business. A managing agency was usually a
partnership, sometimes a privately owned joint stock company
which acquired a controlling interest in different industrial
enterprises by operating in the share market. The companies
were often floated by the managing agents. Each managing
agency was involved in different economic activities and in
the three major industries in eastern India, tea, jute and
coal control rested with the managing agents. Tea was a
classic example of control by managing agents. Tea companies
in the 1920s and 1930s were registered either as sterling
companies in London or as rupee companies in India. Sterling
companies accounted for 63 percent of the area under tea in
1939 and Public limited rupee companies for about 32 percent
(Plantation Enquiry Commission Report, 1956). However the
distinction between sterling and rupee companies was rather
thin. Even in the case of Sterling companies, the managing
agents exercised control rather than British shareholders(Tom-
linson, 1993). The categorization into rupee and sterling
companies depended on the place of registration of the com-
pany: Calcutta or London and the controlling interests were
held by the managing agent.
Bagchi argues-
"whether a company was registered in the U.K.or in India
depended primarily on the convenience of the managing agents
and a sterling registration did not necessarily mean that much
of the capital invested in the plantation was earned outside
India. Plantations were generally first opened up by a firm
doing business in India or by a planter, who would then turn
to a managing agency house for working capital and for
additional fixed capital. A planter might, also, open up a
plantation and sell it to a joint stock company or a managing
agency house for profit. The registration of the company was a
7mere formality, since most of the capital was held by the
planters of the managing agency firm and their close associ-
ates."
In eastern India most of the tea companies were contro-
lled by relatively few managing agents and the place of regis-
tration of the company did not cause any significant diffe-
rence in their functioning. Thirteen leading agency houses
controlled 75 percent of the tea output in India. Many mana-
ging agents controlled both rupee and sterling companies. A
list of sterling companies in 1914 shows that of the 124
companies that existed 42 were controlled by four of the
prominent managing agents in the industry: George Williamson
and Company, Octavious Steel and Company, Walter Duncan and
Company and R.G. Shaw and Company. Their counterparts in India
controlled 34 of the 88 tea companies registered in eastern
India in 1911 (Bagchi, 1972).
An important implication of the managing agency system
was that it may have permitted a higher degree of monopoly in
the industry than is indicated by the number of firms in the
industry. Although the industry had a very large number of
plantations, each of which had a small share in total output,
the share of each managing agent in total output was substan-
tially larger. If the firms belonging to a single managing
agent acted in concert, and sought to maximize the profits of
the group as a whole, this implies that the industry is better
viewed as an oligopoly than as a competitive industry. As we
have already noted, most firms in Eastern India were contro-
lled by a few managing agents. More than half the firms in our
data set are controlled by 5 managing agents and these account
8for over 50 percent of the output. Four of these agents are
Williamson and Magor with 17 firms, Octavious Steel with 6
Duncan Brothers with 17 and Shaw Wallace with 5. These mana-
ging agents were important for both sterling and rupee compa-
nies. The fifth Andrew Yule controlled 12. A single managing
agent being responsible for the performance of a number of
plantations was more concerned with the performance of these
plantations taken together, rather than any single plantation.
Consequently, these managing agents would partly internalize
the negative externality which expanding output conferred upon
the industry as a whole.
The industry came to be organized into associations to
represent the interest of the producers as early as the 1880s.
Indian Tea Association was founded in 1881 with representa-
tives of nine managing agency houses which had major interests
in tea. The setting up of district-level organizations fol-
lowed. The Indian Tea Association was the dominant player in
north India. There were several small associations represen-
ting Indian interests. They worked in harmony with the Indian
Tea Association and usually emphasized their specific problems
arising due to size (Griffiths, 1967). Southern planters had
their own association known as the United Planters’ Associa-
tion. Right from the beginning there was a difference between
the two associations- while individuals dominated the functio-
ning of the United Planters’ Association and dissent was
common, in the Indian Tea Association big companies exercised
tight control (Griffiths, 1967).
94. CONTROL SCHEMES
The attempts to restrict output in the 1930s were prompt-
ed by the decline in tea prices after 1925. Prices fell, both
in Calcutta and in London, in the period 1925-29, and this
decline was also accompanied by an accumulation of stocks - in
1929, the stocks in London represented six months’ supply, the
highest in 30 years. The first control scheme was devised at
this point, and took effect in the year 1930. This scheme was
backed by an international agreement, between the associations
of tea producers of India, Ceylon and Indonesia. The agree-
ment was that tea plantations would reduce output, and that
the extent of output reduction would be greater for lower
quality common teas. There was a gradation of four qualities,
and the implicit quotas (which had no legal sanction) were
fixed as a proportion of 1929 output. These proportions ranged
from 85 percent, for the lowest quality producers, to 97
percent, to producers of premium tea.
From our perspective, the important aspect of the first
control scheme is that compliance with the scheme was purely
voluntary - there was no legislative action which enforced
output reduction or regulated exports. Nevertheless, the
aggregate data on tea production suggests that the scheme was
successful in India, where output declined by 10 percent
(International Tea Statistics). However, there were disagree-
ments regarding continuation of the agreement. The main pro-
blem was that Indonesia was not perceived to be doing enough -
the reduction in Indonesian output was only 5 percent and
further, producers in Indonesia were unhappy with the terms
10of the agreement. There were also divergent opinions within
India - although the major tea producers of Eastern India
would have liked an extension of the control scheme, the
United Planters’s Association representing producers in South
India were divided in its opinion. The Chairman of the asso-
ciation spoke strongly against restrictions on output citing
the failure of such schemes in coffee and rubber (Griffiths,
1967). As a result, despite a dismal price situation, the
control scheme was given up after one year, and there was no
agreement to reduce output in the years 1931 and 1932. P r ices
reached a rock bottom in 1932 in all categories of tea, and
the low prices of good quality teas prompted consumers to
switch away from common teas, resulting in a large increase in
the stocks of common teas.
This fall in prices prompted the International Tea
Agreement of 1933, between the main producer nations, India,
Ceylon and Indonesia, who accounted for 80 per cent of the
world tea output. The agreement envisioned a reduction in
output as well as exports, and required the governments of the
respective countries to legislate in order to ensure com-
pliance with the agreement.
In India, legislation pertained to exports and to the
expansion of acreage, and took effect in November 1933. The
Indian government passed the Tea Control Act to regulate
exports of tea and planting. Export quotas were fixed for the
next five years on the basis of maximum annual export in the
period 1929-31. The expansion in acreage was to be limited to
0.5 per cent of the existing planted area.
11To summarize, the control scheme of the years 1934-38 had
the backing of the Indian state, which legislated export
quotas and restricted expansion of acreage. Although there was
no direct legislation to restrict output, it is clear that the
combination of export/acreage restrictions could provide a
close substitute. The international market was pre-eminent,
and from international trade theory, it is clear that export
restrictions will translate into reduced output (see for
example, Corden, 1984). The control scheme was successful in
reducing exports and output, thereby raising tea prices. In
1933 aggregate output in India declined by 12 percent and in
Ceylon and Indonesia by over 10 percent (International Tea
statistics). The average price of tea in the Calcutta auctions
rose by 80 percent.
The year 1933 provides an extremely interesting year of
transition. In January 1933, a referendum was held within the
India tea industry, and showed 92 per cent of the producers in
support of the scheme, with a mere 2.5 per cent dissenting and
the rest were undecided (Griffiths, 1967). The international
tea agreement was signed in February. The Tea Licensing Com-
mittee was set up in June to allocate export quotas. and the
Tea Control Act, which gave legal sanction to these quotas,
was passed by the Government of India in November. In the
interim, in a second referendum in June, over 90 percent of
the Indian tea industry expressed support for voluntary output
restriction. This sequence of events illustrates three impor-
tant points. First, there was a more-or-less explicit agree-
ment for voluntary output reduction in the industry, for
12almost the entire year. Second, the export restrictions were
not given legislative sanction for most of the year. Third,
producers in the industry were aware, from at least March, if
not earlier, that legislative action was forthcoming to reduce
exports, and that such action would be in force fairly soon.
The focus of this paper is on the producers’ compliance
with the control schemes in the years 1930 and 1933. In the
year 1930, any compliance must have been entirely voluntary,
since there was no legal enforcement of the control scheme.
The year 1933 is more complex. As discussed in the previous
section, there were no legal measures to restrict output, and
the enforcement of export quotas only came at the end of the
year. Further, since producers were aware that legally binding
export quotas would be in force in the future, these anticipa-
tions could affect there current behaviour.
The tea producers of eastern India also made efforts to
secure legislative control on output for the domestic market.
In June 1933, a referendum within the industry on a scheme to
limit production for sale in India to 12 per cent of each
estate’s best crop showed a mixed response - the sterling
companies in both east and south supported the scheme, but the
southern rupee companies were divided. The scheme was not
given legislative effect due to opposition from the United
Planter’s Association representing the southern estates. Tea
production declined from 434 million pounds in 1932 to 383
million pounds in 1934. Voluntary restriction continued in
1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937, although the support for restric-
ting output was obtained with some difficulty in 1936. As the
13price situation improved the proportion of output that could
be produced for the Indian market was raised to 14 percent.
The success of the price support schemes in the tea
industry may be attributed to the ability to reduce output.
Regulating output through plucking was undoubtedly important
for this. The question which is addressed in this paper is how
did the effect of the control schemes translate to the level
of the individual firm. Was the restriction on output enforced
at the level of the firm? Although the circumstances of the
control schemes were different, if firms reduced output volun-
tarily in 1930 and 1933, then there was explicit collusion in
the industry in order to raise international prices.
5. A SIMPLE MODEL OF NON-COOPERATIVE COLLUSION
Consider an oligopolistic industry with n firms, {1,2,..-
,n}. We make two simplifying assumptions - first, the product
is homogeneous, and second that all firms have identical cost
functions. Let qi be the quantity produced by firm i and let





The industry price is given by the inverse demand function
p(Q). The firm’s profits are given by:
p =q i p(Q) - ci(qi)...........(2)
Let Q-i denote the total output of all firms except firm i,
that is Q-i =Q-q i .
Equation (2) reveals that the firm’s profits depend on its own
14output (qi) and the aggregate output of the other firms (Q-i).
Write p(qi,Q-i) for this function.
Our focus is on symmetric equilibria. Suppose that all firms
in the industry are producing q units of output. Define the
best response of firm i, f(q), by:
f(q) = argmax p[qi,(n-1)q]...........(3)
qi
We assume that f(q) is continuous and decreasing. A Cournot
Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of this function, i.e. a
(q*) such that q* = f(q*). Under our assumptions, a Cournot
Nash equilibrium exists and is unique.
Since the work of Friedman (1971), it is well known that
repeated interaction allows firms to collude. Suppose that the
oligopoly is infinitely repeated and that firms maximize
discounted profits, where d is the discount rate. Firms can
restrict output to the level q
c. This collusion can be suppor-
ted in the following way: if all firms collude in period t and
produce q
c or less, the collusion continues in subsequent
periods, so that firms continue to restrict output to q
c. Howe-
ver, if any firm deviates in the current period, then all
firms switch to producing the Cournot output q* for T periods.
Such a strategy is called a T-period trigger strategy. In the
extreme case, of an infinite trigger, the reversion to Cournot
behaviour is for the entire future. Such a trigger strategy
allows firms to collude, since a deviation from collusive
behaviour is made unprofitable. Although each firm can increa-
se its profits in the current period by increasing output, it
15suffers the loss that future collusion breaks down. An
output level q











m be the maximum level of collusion that can be sustained
in this industry.
Although the above shows that collusion can be a non-
cooperative equilibrium in repeated interaction, this is not
the only equilibrium . Producing Cournot outputs in every
period continues to be an equilibrium. In fact, every output
level between q
m and q
c can be supported as an equilibrium in
the industry. This suggests that coordinating on a single
equilibrium is perhaps a more difficult problem than enforcing
the equilibrium. This coordination problem is aggravated when
producers are heterogeneous since there is not even a unique
symmetric equilibrium which is most collusive. The control
schemes may have played an important role in overcoming the
coordination problem, so that all producers agreed to shift
from a less collusive equilibrium, in the period before 1930,
to a more collusive equilibrium, in the years of the control
schemes. In this interpretation, the control schemes, being
voluntary, did not change the industry fundamentals and the
set of possible equilibria, but coordinated expectations in
the move from a less collusive to a more collusive equilibrium
within this set.
We now augment this simple model, to examine the effect
of quotas, i.e. legally enforceable output restrictions.
16First, quite obviously, quotas may allow a greater degree of
output restriction than is feasible non-cooperatively. More
subtle is the effect of an expected introduction of quotas in
the future, which is relevant for our analysis of the year
1933. Suppose that firms expect quota levels q
k to be enforced
from the next period, where q
k < q* . This implies that Cournot
behaviour is no longer possible in the future. This makes
collusion more difficult this period, since the quotas reduce
the severity of future punishments. Current outputs (qi) are












k < q*, the right hand side of equation (5) is less
than the right hand side of equation (4) and hence less collu-
sion is possible in the current period. Further, consider the
case where q
k <q
m , i.e. the quota seeks to enforce the an
output reduction which is at least as low as that the in-
dustry can enforce non-cooperatively. In this case future
punishment is completely ineffectual, and there can be no
collusion today, i.e. the only equilibrium is where the in-
dustry chooses the Cournot output today. Hence we may conclude
that the expectation of quotas in the future makes collusion
more difficult today (see Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986, Shapi-
ro, 1989).
The literature since Friedman has augmented this simple
model of oligopolistic collusion in several ways. Abreu (1986)
showed that firms could sustain a higher degree by taking
recourse to punishments which were more severe than Cournot
17reversion. Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983) analyze
the situation where firms could not monitor the output deci-
sions of their rivals, and showed that collusion could ne-
vertheless be supported.
These models of oligopolistic collusion consider the
situation where all firms in the industry are partners to the
collusive agreement, and where there is no new entry into the
industry. This is not quite the case in the tea industry,
where barriers to entry were not so significant. The industry
had a "competitive fringe" of independent tea planters, who
were not controlled by managing agents. These plantations were
mainly located in South India, were smaller in size then the
plantations of Eastern India, and were mainly Indian owned.
Oligopoly theory suggests that these smaller firms would have
less incentive to stick to a collusive agreement, since their
marginal revenue from expanding output is large, due to their
small effect on the market price. Legally enforceable quotas
may therefore be more important in order to restrain such
firms from expanding market share during the period of a
collusive agreement. The existence of a competitive fringe is
likely to have prompted the Indian Tea Association to lobby
for legislative control rather than have an informal collusive
arrangement within the industry.
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We analyze two different types of data in this section of
the paper - aggregate time series data and firm level panel
data. Our purpose is to estimate the effect of control schemes
18on output. We begin by analyzing annual time series data on
the quantity of aggregate output of tea and a price index of
tea, over a period of 21 years, from 1919 to 1939. We estimate
an aggregate supply-response function in the industry, based
on the following equation:
ln yt = b0 + b1 ln p
e
t + b2 time + b3 cst + et ..........(6)
where ln yt is the aggregate output of tea in India in logs, ln
p
e
t is the logarithm of the expected price of tea, time is a
time trend representing shift factors, and cst is a dummy
variable which takes the value one in the years when control
schemes are in operation. These are the years when output or
exports are regulated, either by voluntary agreement or by
law, i.e. the years 1920, 1930, 1933, and 1934-39. We use two
methods for proxying the expected price. The first is the
lagged price of tea, which is valid as a regressor for the
expected price if producers have adaptive expectations. The
second approach is to assume that the producers have rational
expectations. In this case the expected price equals the
actual current price plus a white noise error term. In this
case, we include the current price amongst our regressors, and
use instrumental variables for estimation.
The results are reported in table 3. Two factors need to
be noted. First, the elasticity of supply of tea is signifi-
cantly different from zero in either estimation, and is around
15 percent. Secondly and more importantly from the point of
view of this paper, the control schemes seem to have no signi-
19ficant effect on output. Although the coefficient on the
control scheme dummy is negative, it fails to be statistically
significant. This negative result seems robust across a number
of different specifications that we estimated, and is note-
worthy, since the many of the years witnessed explicit legal
restrictions upon exports. We also experimented with a number
of other specifications, including for example lagged output
as a regressor, in order to allow for possible sluggish ad-
justment. These other regressors failed to be significant, and
did not modify our basic results. This result may be contras-
ted with the results we obtain using firm level data, which we
now turn to. In our view, the firm-level data is more infor-
mative since it provides information at the level of the
micro-unit.
The focus of this paper is on firm level data, which
includes annual output figures on a sample of 114 firms for a
period of five years, 1929-1933. These firms are rupee compa-
nies, which are all managed by managing agents, and are loca-
ted in four regions of eastern India: Assam, Cachar and Sylh-
et, Darjeeling, Dooars and Terai. The tea produced by these
companies are of different qualities, depending on the re-
gion, ranging from the fine teas of Darjeeling to the common
teas of Cachar and Sylhet. The prices of the various qualities
of tea reflect the differences in quality, and we have region-
specific prices for each of the years under consideration.
These prices are those quoted in the Calcutta auctions for
teas of each of the four regions.
We estimate the effect of control schemes on the output
20decisions of these companies. In the five years under conside-
ration, control schemes are operative in 1930 and 1933.
We do not include the other years of export regulation since
the reduction in output could be due to the existence of
quotas and tight control exercised by the Licensing authority.
Our hypothesis is that the output of firm i, belonging to
region j, in year t is given by the following supply function:
xit = ai + b1 pjt + b2 cs30 + b3 cs33 + eit........(7)
where xit is the output of firm i in year t, and pjt is the
price of tea in year t in the relevant region. cs30 and cs33 are
dummy variables which take value 1 in the years 1930 and 1933
respectively. We estimate this basic equation in levels as
well as in logs, i.e. taking ln xit and ln pjt. In either formu-
lation we allow for firm specific fixed effects, i.e. we allow
ai to differ across firms. This is a major advantage of our
data set, i.e. that we are able to allow for heterogeneity
across firms arising from differences in soil quality, past
investment levels, managerial input, etc.
A remark is in order regarding the use of pjt, the region
specific price, in the regression. We use the price as a proxy
for demand shift variables, which we do not observe. The price
variable will be exogenous only if the individual firm acts as
a price taker. This assumption is of course open to question -
our discussion of the managing agency system suggests that
even if the individual firm is small, the managers of the firm
could well take into account the negative effects of their
21output decisions upon other firms in the industry which were
managed by the same agency. Accordingly, we estimate the
equation by instrumental variables as well as ordinary least
squares. We estimate a fixed- effects model using ordinary
least squares. Next we assume price to be endogenous. We
estimate the equation in first differences using lagged price
and lagged output as instruments.
Tables 4 and 5 report our estimations. Table 4 reports
the results for the specification in levels while table 5
shows our results for the specification in logs. Both tables
report the ordinary least squares regression and the case when
the price variable is instrumented. Our basic finding is
robust and is replicated in all our regressions. The coeffi-
cients on both the control scheme variables is negative and
statistically significant. The estimation procedure (OLS
versus IV) does not affect the coefficients on the control
scheme variables. The effect of the control scheme is larger
in magnitude in 1933 than in 1930. This difference is signifi-
cant- the null hypothesis is that b2 is equal to b3 rejected
by an F- test. This is not surprising as the circumstances of
the two control schemes were different as we have already
discussed.
However, when we estimate a more restrictive formulation
of equation (7) by using a single dummy variable for the
control scheme, thereby restricting the coefficients to be
identical, our basic result remains the same- the coefficient
of the dummy variable is negative and statistically signifi-
cant (see table 6).
22The other coefficient of interest is the coefficient of
the price variable. This is positive in all the formulations
and statistically significant when estimated with ordinary
least squares.
7. AN EXPLANATION
Our main empirical finding is that the plantations in our
sample reduced output significantly in the years of operation
of the control schemes, i.e. the years 1930 and 1933, the
extent of output reduction being somewhat larger in the latter
year. This reduction, we claim was voluntary and the firms’
compliance with the control schemes indicates collusive beha-
viour in the industry. The importance of this finding, based
on firm level data, needs to be highlighted, since our analy-
sis of aggregate time series data for a longer period, inclu-
ding a period of legally enforced export quotas, fails to find
a significant effect of the control schemes upon output. In
this section we discuss possible explanations for the success
of the scheme in the years 1930 and 1933.
One explanation for the success of the control schemes is
in terms of the model of collusive behaviour. As section 3 of
this paper has discussed, the managing agency system permitted
the industry to effectively function as an oligopoly. Effecti-
ve control in the industry was more concentrated than is
suggested by the number of firms. This may have allowed the
industry to sustain a collusive outcome despite the absence of
any legal sanctions which enforce collusion. Despite this
potential for collusive behaviour, the industry remained at a
23relatively non-collusive equilibrium in the period before
1929. The control scheme of 1930 represented an explicit
agreement to move towards a more collusive equilibrium, thus
overcoming the coordination problem arising from the multipli-
city of repeated game equilibria. This was also the case in
1933.
This raises the question, what did the reversion to more
competitive behaviour in the years 1931 and 1932 represent?
Was it a punishment phase, in response to the failure of some
producers to comply with the 1930 agreement? Or was it simply
a reversion to a less collusive equilibrium, due to the absen-
ce of an agreement to coordinate expectations. In our view,
the first interpretation seems somewhat unlikely, on two
counts. First, our empirical results show that firms in 1930
reduced output, in line with the agreement. Second, the firms
of Eastern India (of which our sample is a subset) were keen
to continue the agreement, as our discussion of section 4
shows. The main opposition to the agreement came from a sec-
tion of the planters of South India, and seem to be motivated
more by their dissatisfaction with the terms of the agreement
than the perception that some firms were cheating. Hence it
seems more likely that the break-down of collusion in the
years 1931 and 1932 were due to failure to renew the agreement
of 1930- a problem of coordination. On this interpretation,
the two periods, 1930 and 1933, and 1931-32 represent two
different equilibria rather than different phases of a single
repeated game equilibrium. We note here the great advantage of
our data set, which makes it possible to disentangle the
24different possible interpretations. The control schemes repre-
sent an explicit, non-binding agreement. The explicitness of
the agreement, and the open discussions regarding it, allow us
to discern the views of the parties concerned in a way which
is not possible when collusion is tacit or secret, as is
normally the case in contemporary times.
The failure to renew the agreement in 1931-32 was not
probably anticipated in the year 1930, when firms decided to
comply with the control scheme, since otherwise the firms
would have little incentive to comply. Nevertheless, firms
must have been aware that there was opposition to the control
scheme from some quarters, and consequently that such a non-
renewal was possible. This would have undermined the incentive
to collude in 1930. Similarly, in the year 1933, firms were
well aware that legally enforced quotas were imminent. As we
have discussed in section 5, this makes collusion very
difficult. Nevertheless, our data shows that firms did reduce
output in both years, and in fact the extent of output reduc-
tion was greater in the year 1933 than in 1930. This suggests
that there were perhaps other factors which helped sustain
collusion in this period, over and above the models of collu-
sion which we have discussed. We turn to these other factors
now.
The plantations controlled by managing agents in eastern
India reduced output, whereas the smaller independent planta-
tions of South India and other peripheral areas expanded
market share in this period. Our finding with micro data that
firms reduce output in response to the control scheme is in
25line with aggregate data on tea output. The latter show that
there is a decline in output in the two years when the con-
trol scheme is operative- 1930 and 1933 (see table 7). The
only dissent appears to be from the producers in Bihar, Uttar
Pradesh and Punjab who accounted for less than 1 percent of
the tea output. Data show that there is an increase in their
output in 1930 and 1933 and total output increased by over 40
percent between 1929 and 1937. There is also a steady increase
in the total output of the south Indian plantations- in 1937
their output is 22 percent higher than the output of 1929. For
Assam and Bengal the output level in 1937 was still lower than
that at the beginning of the Depression. This again points to
the existence of a competitive fringe in the industry. They
were the free-riders and increased their market share in the
period of the collusion.
In addition to the above purely economic explanation,
there may also be a socio-political reason for the success of
the control scheme, and for the differential response between
the plantations in Eastern India and the South. The planta-
tions of Eastern India were mainly British owned, and the
managing agents were British expatriates as well. The planta-
tions in the South were mainly owned and controlled by the
rising Indian capital, and the 1920s had seen a rapid entry of
Indian capital into the industry. British expatriate business
in India was a small and cohesive social group, with a keen
sense of its own identity in a colonial environment. This
social cohesion was all the greater in tea plantations, which
were far from any metropolis, and close only to each other. In
26a small and isolated social group where any individual has few
opportunities for outside interaction, social sanctions are
powerful. Akerlof (1976) has argued that such social sanctions
may prevent an individual from maximizing his or her indivi-
dual economic benefit. Consequently, output restriction may
have been facilitated, since any deviator would have face
social sanctions. Such social sanctions did not apply to the
plantations in the peripheral areas. The Indian planters did
not belong to the same social group and the same sanctions
could be applied to them. Indeed, it has been argued that the
control schemes were used to maintain the domination of the
British managing agents and prevent the entry of Indian capi-
tal (Rothermund, 1992). The active campaign by the Indian Tea
Association for legislative controls on exports and output in-
dicates that although firms colluded successfully, they anti-
cipated free-riding and perceived legislation to an effective
way to prevent this. The Association even offered help to the
customs authorities in monitoring exports (Rothermund, 1992).
The 1920s had seen a rapid increase in the entry of Indian
capital in industry. The Tea Agreement, by setting export
quotas on the basis of past performance, froze the relative
position of firms in the export market. The restriction on
acreage prevented entry as well as expansion of new planta-
tions. So the agreement went against the interest of the new
plantations. Many of these were located in the south of India.
Most of the plantations in the east had been in existence for
a longer time and had attained their desired capacity. All the
companies in our data set had been in existence in 1920. This
27group had an interest in maintaining status-quo. Although the
export quotas were fixed, the southern planters had increased
their market share from 13.5 percent to 16.6 percent. At the
same time, the firms in Assam and Bengal appear to have res-
tricted output voluntarily and lost market share. This is
borne out by our econometric estimation. The collusion worked
well within one group of planters and not the others. The
success of the control schemes in regulating output at the
level of plantations in Assam and Bengal may be explained by
the close control exercised by the managing agents. However,
the social aspect of the group behaviour must also be emphasi-
zed.
The majority of the planters in Assam and Bengal belonged
to the expatriate business community. This was not true of the
south where many of the new plantations belonged to the Indian
capital. Many of the planters in the south were new and the
plantations were smaller. They had their own association and
were not willing to go along with the ITA on many occasions.
Collusion was effective within the same social group, but was
not effective for "outsiders" to the group. The break down of
collusive behaviour in the jute industry may be related to
the presence of many firms outside the cartel, mainly repre-
senting Indian capital which led to considerable free-riding
by firms outside as well as inside the jute mills’ association
(Goswami 1991, Tomlinson 1993). In the tea industry on the
other hand the control of the expatriates dominant in the
1930s and they did collude successfully to increase interna-
tional prices.
28The response of the firms in eastern India may be un-
derstood by looking at the colonial context and the operation
of expatriate business. Many kinds of economic and non-econo-
mic entry barriers were used to maintain a privileged posi-
tion. Restricting output to maintain prices was an accepted
norm among the agents and was used in several industries. The
role of social factors in the group behaviour may perhaps
explain why firms voluntarily restricted output rather than
play truant in an industry where the control of expatriate
business was still dominant.
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Table 2
SHARE IN WORLD EXPORTS(PERCENT)
YEAR INDIA CEYLON INDONESIA
1927 40.8 25.0 15.9
1930 40.1 26.1 17.7
1934 38.7 27.0 18.6
1938 36.1 25.6 17.2
SOURCE: International Tea Committee, Bulletin of statistics.
32Table 3
REGRESSION RESULTS: A TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS (1919-39)
SHORT-RUN SUPPLY RESPONSE TO PRICE





















NOTE: The t-ratio is given in parentheses.
*** denotes significant at 99 percent.
Source: Investors’ India Year Books.
33TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF PANEL-DATA























NOTE: The t-ratio is given in parentheses.
* denotes significant at 90 per cent.
** denotes significant at 95 percent.
*** denotes significant at 99 percent.
Source: Investors’ India Year Books.
34TABLE 5
ANALYSIS OF PANEL-DATA
No. of Firms = 114























NOTE: The t-ratio is given in parentheses.
* denotes significant at 90 per cent.
** denotes significant at 95 percent.
*** denotes significant at 99 percent.
Source: Investors’ India Year Books.
35TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF PANEL-DATA
No. of Firms = 114















NOTE: The dummy variable cs takes the value the value 1 for
1930 and 1933 and 0 for the other years.
The t-ratio is given in parentheses.
* denotes significant at 90 per cent.
** denotes significant at 95 percent.
*** denotes significant at 99 percent.
Source: Investors’ India Year Books.
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SOURCE: International Tea Committee, Bulletin of Statistics,
1946.
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